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13 Concluding discussion 
We began this book by describing the way non-resident fathers had 
become vilified as feckless 'Deadbeat Dads' in some media and political 
discourse. Clearly there are some non-resident fathers who through 
anger, hurt or general vindictiveness are failing to support their chil-
dren financially and in other ways, although they can afford to. But a 
much more pervasive picture that emerges from this research is that of 
men struggling to be the fathers of non-resident children. 
What these men had to do was to surmount a number of internal 
and external problems when they became non-resident fathers. They 
had to deal with the practical difficulties of life — they had to provide 
money for their own household and their family; they had to provide 
adequate housing so that children had a place to visit; they had to have 
the time to spend with their children; and they needed energy and 
patience to be active parents. They also had to deal with the sense of 
loss over daily interactions with their children and had to adjust to 
parenting full-time on a part-time basis, if they mainly saw their chil-
dren at weekends. Similarly, tensions could exist where the mother and 
father expected different codes of conduct and behaviour from their 
children in their respective households. These factors could have an 
impact on the fathers' relationships with their children. 
In the first qualitative study we found that children and grandmothers 
(particularly the fathers' parents) were major actors in maintaining con-
tact. The children of non-resident fathers have generally not been seen 
as significant actors who negotiate contact time with their fathers either 
directly or through their mothers. Some children in this sample were 
prepared to travel long distances on their own to see their fathers and 
some negotiated a change of residency across their parents' households. 
The age of children was important, not necessarily in terms of the 
continuity of contact (we had no evidence to explore this), but the 
nature of contact where it was already established. Some fathers found 
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that as their children got older they were 'growing away from home' and 
following their own interests; others felt they had got closer to their 
children and saw them more frequently and on an individual basis. These 
variable outcomes might explain the results in the quantitative survey 
— that the older the age of the younger child, the greater the likelihood 
that fathers would not have regular contact. The fathers in the first 
qualitative study reported that their young teenage children were busy 
with employment, friends and other interests and that they (the fathers) 
had to learn to accept that they were taking second place. This of course 
may be just as much a feature of resident fatherhood as non-resident 
fatherhood. Importantly, these findings highlight the limitations in meas-
uring non-resident fathers' relationships with children as if they were a 
single unit who had uniform contact arrangements. Grandmothers could 
also be intimately involved in maintaining contact with children, not only 
for their own relationships as grandparents but also acting as guardians 
for the fathers' relationships. More research is needed to find out not 
only how much support is offered by grandmothers, but also how this 
works in practice and under what circumstances. 
There remains a debate about the importance of contact between 
non-resident fathers and their children. In contrast to the findings of 
Simpson et al. (1995), whose data were collected in 1991, we found 
that fathers were very keen to maintain contact with their children after 
relationship breakdown. It has previously been common to assume that 
it was in the best interests of all those involved to make a 'clean break', 
and for fathers to give up contact, especially where there was conflict 
with mothers. It was the received wisdom that by not seeing their 
children, the fathers made life easier for all concerned, and that by 
maintaining contact, the misery and heartache that occurred after the 
relationship breakdown continued indefinitely (Goldstein, Freud and 
Solnit, 1973). Research in the USA by Wallerstein and Kelly (1980) 
and in Britain by Richards and Dyson (1982) has since led to a revision 
of this view. It is now thought that it is better for children, if not for 
their parents, for the fathers to maintain contact, not only for the child's 
emotional health but also for its social and cognitive development (that 
is, where abuse is not a feature of the father—child relationship). The 
terms of the Children Act 1989 reflect this view that the sharing of 
parental responsibility should be encouraged — under this Act the old 
notion of 'care and control' or custody being awarded to one parent has 
been swept away. Rather it is hoped that parents will seek to make 
their own arrangements, with the law stepping in as a last resort to 
arrange the residency of children and contact. Nonetheless, the bathers 
presented by travelling large distances and long gaps in contact, find 
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some men questioning whether the effort was 'worth it'. At the same 
time, however, though some fathers were resigned to loss of contact, 
others remain very bitter and angry and felt they had been let down by 
the legal system, which would not act to enforce contact effectively. As 
Walker (1996) has pointed out, it is difficult for any external authority 
to ensure contact, or at least not without risk of damage to all involved. 
Yet Smart and Neale (1997) argue that there has been a 'strong pre-
sumption' in favour of contact and that now judicial treatment has 
adopted a 'rigid and dogmatic' form which is harmful. Mothers are now 
viewed as being 'implacably hostile' when reluctant to allow contact, 
whereas before it was believed they were acting in the best interests of 
the children and in any case it was felt to be unrealistic to enforce it as 
it would necessitate separating out the interests of the child from the 
circumstances of the parent with daily primary care. Increasingly, argue 
Neale and Smart (1997), the legal profession is using coercive techniques 
including the threat of imprisonment — even in the face of evidence in 
some cases where the children were visibly distressed during supervised 
contact visits with their fathers — and where the previous behaviour of 
fathers, towards mothers at least, has been known to be violent. Under 
this egalitarian ethos Neale and Smart question 'whether it will soon be 
possible to be critical of any kind of fathering'. 
What this serves to highlight is the interwoven nature of the needs 
and interests of mothers, children and non-resident fathers. Giving pri-
macy to the needs of either of the parents can result in losing the best 
interests of children — a fine balance needs to be struck; yet the needs 
and interests of these three major parties may constantly shift, requiring 
a responsive and refined approach in the exercise of the law. We certainly 
do not advocate that all fathers should have contact with their children, 
but there must come a point where men's complaints about their lost 
relationships with their children must be taken seriously. Legal enforcement 
is not the answer, and in any event it comes too late after relationships 
between the parents have completely broken down. Mediation seems 
the most hopeful way forward, though it has been argued that this 
approach can also coerce mothers to comply with contact. 
As we have seen, contact with the child is very closely associated 
with whether child support is paid. The Child Support Act 1991 was 
based on the principle that biological fathers have an absolute and 
unreserved responsibility to provide financial support for their children 
throughout their lives. Not all the fathers accepted this principle. The 
maintenance obligation is one that was negotiated. Fathers arrived at a 
commitment to pay maintenance by weighing up the strength of the 
financial obligation in the context of their own personal, financial and 
t  
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family circumstances and those of the mother and children. In practice, 
the obligation to pay was never unconditional, it always depended on 
circumstances. It partly depended on the father's ability to pay, the 
children's material need for maintenance and the mother's and her 
partner's (if she had a partner) ability to provide financially. But most 
importantly it was the history of the relationship with the mother that 
was the overriding factor in making a commitment to pay maintenance. 
From the fathers' perspective it was mothers who were claiming main-
tenance (albeit on behalf of children), not the children. This claim had 
to be legitimised before fathers would pay. Primarily, the mother's right 
to claim maintenance on behalf of children was accepted if she at least 
recognised, if not actively supported, the father's independent relation-
ship with his child(ren). If the mothers failed to accept the father—child 
relationship or failed to sustain it through granting contact, then the fathers 
found this extremely difficult to comprehend. This incomprehension 
induced an overwhelming sense of victimisation and powerlessness among 
those men who wanted a relationship with their children but were 
unable to achieve it in the face of what they saw as selfish and callous 
mothers. The resultant attitude tended to be that there was no point in 
paying maintenance because the children would not know their fathers 
were supporting them, there was no guarantee that the money would 
be spent for the children's benefit and the fathers were 'paying for a 
child they were not seeing'. Thus not only would fathers get 'nothing 
back' in return for maintenance (contact with their children), but pay-
ment was meaningless because the fathers' act of giving was rendered 
invisible to the children themselves. Children would be unaware of the 
symbolic expression of love and care embedded within the act of giving 
maintenance money, particularly when, in the absence of contact, there 
was no other means through which fathers could demonstrate their 
affections to children directly. Therefore the obligation to pay main-
tenance was intimately linked with contact through the relationship with 
the mother, and the different outcomes of the process of negotiation 
(payment or non-payment) primarily hinged upon this relationship. 
As we have seen, financial obligations are not straightforward; non-
resident fathers are one step removed from their children and con-
sequently it appears that money takes on greater significance in these 
relationships. Whether we like it or not, men seem to use money to at 
least ease relationships with mothers, if not to persuade mothers to 
agree to contact. Maintenance money is also earmarked for specific 
purposes and endowed with particular meanings. The maintenance 
obligation therefore is not just a bill to be paid, but is given on the basis 
of the nature of the relationships that underpin it. Thus we have different 
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expressions of the obligation — gift maintenance, entitled maintenance 
and compensatory maintenance. For some, maintenance was enforced 
and enforced maintenance carried no endowed meaning other than 
through its withdrawal, which could send messages to the mother of 
the father's disquiet and anger. 
Child support, not contact, has been the most salient and controver-
sial policy arena concerning non-resident fathers in recent years and the 
approach to child support obligations has been transformed in a very 
short period. Under the French Code Napoleon of 1804, 'The search 
for paternity is forbidden' (section 340). In British case law and in practice 
if not in statute, by the end of the 1980s the rights of non-resident 
fathers to have control over and access to their children had become 
dissipated. Their obligations to maintain their former partner and children 
had effectively lapsed as well. The approach to financial responsibility 
for children tended to be based on the household formation — or social 
relationships — whether they were biological or not. Thus stepfathers 
took on the financial responsibility for children in their care when they 
were recognised as a 'child of the family'. In practice, social fathering 
rather than biological fathering had become the accepted basis on which 
a child—father relationship existed and financial obligations were deter-
mined. As Maclean (1993) notes, in the private law in the United 
Kingdom the apportionment of financial responsibility between social 
parenthood and biological parenthood tended to be pragmatic and based 
on the needs and resources of all involved rather than upon any firm rule. 
However, at the end of the 1980s a combination of factors led to 
a remarkable reassertion of the obligations of biological fathers and 
separated partners to each other. It arose in the legal context of burgeon-
ing recognition of children's tights as capable individuals — which began 
with the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 where courts 
were instructed to give primacy to the interests of children when set-
tling divorce. It partly arose in the political context of 'moral panic' 
associated with the Victorian values/`back to basics' anxieties of the 
Conservative Governments of Margaret Thatcher and John Major. The 
practice of the legal profession to make low child maintenance awards 
to protect lone parents' full entitlement to social assistance (Eekelaar, 
1991), and the failure of the DSS liable relative sections to actively 
pursue maintenance from parents, were said to be deeply embarrassing 
to the Conservative Government under Margaret Thatcher, which was 
committed to encouraging individual responsibility and reducing the 
welfare role of the state (Maclean, 1994). It was also partly generated by 
anxiety about the rising level of public expenditure associated with the 
increase in lone parents and their increased dependency on social assistance 
t  
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and public housing. It was certainly reinforced by anxieties about the 
impact of family breakdown on the living standards of lone parent families 
and the impact of this poverty, and the disruption and the experience 
of living in a lone parent household, on the well-being and future 
development of children (Rodgers and Prior, 1998). 
Though not all the legislation affecting family law in recent years has 
been influenced by all these factors, one or more of the factors have 
been influential in determining the nature of the Children Act 1989, 
which affirmed that in care proceedings following separation and divorce 
the best interest of the child should be 'paramount% the Child Support 
Act 1991 established an absolute obligation of non-resident fathers to 
provide financial support for their biological children throughout their 
lives; the Family Law Act 1996, as well as seeking to remove the 
vestiges of fault in divorce proceedings, will establish a 'framework' for 
information giving and mediation in marital breakdown. There is more 
legislation expected including an Act to cover pension splitting on 
divorce, legislation to establish the rights of unmarried fathers and a 
major reform of the child support system. 
We have discussed the problems with the present child support scheme 
in the introduction to Chapter 8. At the time of writing, the Govern-
ment are consulting on a Green Paper (UK, Cmnd 3992, 1998) that 
will substantially reform the existing scheme. 
It was a grave error to seek to establish a child support regime based 
on a rigid (and yet complicated) formula administered by the DSS. This 
area of policy 
 calls for a degree of flexible, individualised justice that 
probably cannot be handled within the disciplines and culture of social 
security. When the CSA was being planned, it might have been wiser 
and more effective to have reformed the existing court arrangements to 
increase consistency of adjudication, and to establish mechanisms for 
better review and enforcement. 
What we have now is a split system for child support — the DSS 
dealing  almost exclusively with benefit cases, while non-benefit cases 
make private arrangements between the parents themselves or with the 
support of solicitors. At the same time the Lord Chancellor's Department 
under the Family Law Act 1996 is experimenting with an information 
service and a mediation service following marital breakdown (but not 
cohabitation breakdown) covering the arrangements for children, the 
distribution of property and other assets — in fact everything except 
child support. The Family Law Act has not yet been implemented and 
the decision to reform child support could have presented an oppor-
tunity for thrashing out a common strategy and more coherent set of 
arrangements for negotiating contact, child support and other matters 
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consequent on the breakdown of relationships when children are in-
volved. The difficulty is that we are not starting from scratch — the 
Child Support Agency exists; the Family Law Act exists, after a torrid 
passage through Parliament. The Lord Chancellor does not want to go 
back to the drawing board and certainly is reluctant to take on the 
poisoned chalice of child support, so we are left after the reforms with 
a set of incoherent arrangements. This is despite the vague promises in 
the new child support proposals of having an 'active family policy'. 
Though the proposed reforms have many laudable improvements, 
including a disregard in Income Support, the weakness of the proposed 
new scheme for child support is that the assessments are still formula-
driven and still imposed and enforced completely independently of 
negotiations between the parents about other arrangements for fmancial 
support, contact and other related matters. The results of this research 
show that no child support scheme has a prospect of success unless it is 
based on negotiation between the parents, which is recognised as fair, 
and the perception of fairness on the fathers' part depends more than 
anything on their ability (and the former partners' willingness) to have 
shared parental responsibility for their children. The mistake that the 
Child Support Act made was that the state took a robust moral stance 
in the interests of the taxpayer and imposed a law on people who, it has 
been demonstrated, were not prepared to consent to it. What is needed 
is a service that enables these fathers and mothers to work out arrange-
ments for child support, contact and other matters that concern them. 
Of course the state and taxpayers have an interest and that interest can 
be represented by a framework of guidelines, even a formula, but only 
if it is able to take account of exceptional cases and individual circum-
stances in a reasonably flexible manner. It is possible that the tribunal 
system proposed in the Green Paper could become the vehicle for 
providing such a degree of flexibility if it is allowed to operate fairly 
and freely and is not circumscribed by statute. However, it ought to be 
possible for the adjudication elements to be returned to a reformed 
family court system with the collection and enforcement remaining the 
responsibility of a successor to the Child Support Agency. 
From time to time the Green Paper recognises the need for children 
to have clear signals that their father cares for them and is paying 
maintenance (see for example Chapter 18, para 3). We have found that 
this is a critical issue. At the moment, in the majority of cases the father 
is paying informal support and that is recognised by the child because 
for the most part it is given directly to the child. If the formal child sup-
port regime is going to become more effective, then informal support 
is likely to diminish. Children are going to think that their fathers' 
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contribution (and care) for them is less and this is going to affect their 
relationships with their fathers. The issue of the salience and transparency 
of child support is a major grievance of fathers, an important reason for 
not paying and a cause of non-compliance. Fathers (resident and non-
resident) very commonly define their role and express their affection 
and commitment through the breadwinner role. When they are non-
resident and do not have contact, they do not see any recognition of 
their financial contribution and do not pay or pay informally. It would 
be in everyone's best interest for there to be a formal arrangement for 
informing children (over a certain age) that their fathers are contributing 
to their upkeep. 
There is a proposal in the Green Paper to charge all fathers, regard-
less of their incomes and family commitments, a minimum child sup-
port of Z5 per week. At present, fathers with new children to support 
and who are on Income Support or have a low income are excused 
paying any child support. The justification for this proposal is that 
personal circumstances cannot negate responsibility for one's children. 
But this 'principle' competes with the principle that Income Support is 
supposed to be a floor, a safety net. Although that principle has already 
been breached by direct deductions for utility debts and Social Fund 
loans, it is a further unfortunate undermining of the safety net. It is also 
effectively a transfer from one poor family to another possibly poor 
family Indeed, what it does for lone mothers on Income Support is just 
about compensate them for the abolition of the lone parent premium in 
Income Support — by cutting the Income Support of their former partners. 
There is a balance to be struck between parents and the taxpayer. The 
taxpayer takes primary responsibility for supporting the children of those 
parents who are not in the labour market, and has, and will continue to 
have, responsibility for supporting the children of lone mothers on 
Income Support. This has been the collective arrangement considered 
reasonable since 1948. It is an understandable aspiration to get fathers to 
contribute what they can, where they can, but not where they cannot 
and there is a risk that other children will suffer. 
Connected to this is the fact that there is no limit to the maximum 
maintenance that non-resident fathers will be expected to pay. Judging 
from our results, there will be serious opposition from better-off fathers 
if the scheme expects them to pay more than the costs of a child and 
anything more than necessary to lift their children beyond the scope of 
the benefits system. Why should the state determine how much fathers 
should pay for their non-resident child when it does not involve the 
taxpayer? It would be considered an intolerable assault on personal 
liberty if it happened in a couple family. 
232 Absent Fathers? 
This is perhaps an example of the hint of residual moral vilification of 
non-resident fathers that still emerges from time to time in the Green 
Paper. In general, the language of the Green Paper is a great improve-
ment on that of 'Children Come First'. For example, the Green Paper 
follows our usage of non-resident fathers instead of absent fathers. How-
ever, in Chapter One, para. 1 we are told that child support will be 
`firmly enforced' — effectively enforced might have been received better 
by citizens experiencing government intervention in the complexities 
and intimacies of their private lives. Later in Chapter Two paras 25 and 
26 there is the assumption that all fathers leave their children. Again we 
hear the echoes of the 'walking away' language of Mrs Thatcher, which 
so disastrously inspired the Child Support Acts. Our research shows that 
some fathers are never given a chance to live with their children. In 
other cases mothers take their children and leave the father. Generally, 
separation occurs after much unhappiness. In the end, parents leave 
each other by mutual agreement. Many fathers are sad and frustrated at 
not being able to see their children as much or as often as they would 
like. Their lives, like their children's and former partner's, have been 
disrupted. They are much more likely to be out of employment and 
dependent on a low income. Nevertheless, the majority are in touch 
with their children and the majority are paying either formal or informal 
support. If policy is to be successful in helping parents, both parents, 
to care for their children, it needs to build on these positive elements 
in these human relationships. 
According to Smart (1997) there has been, in the debates about the 
decline and destabilisation of the family, a wishful thinking where it is 
hoped to return 'the family' to some idealised state unaffected by social 
change. However, what appears not to have changed is that fathers are 
still keen to point out that they do care about their non-resident chil-
dren — and that is the problem! Rather convolutedly, it is because they 
care about maintaining their role as fathers and because they continue 
to want a close, intimate and fulfilling relationship with their children, 
that they can become reluctant to pay maintenance. The majority want 
to fulfil all their parental obligations, social, emotional and financial, but 
it seems that one is unsatisfactory without the others. There is therefore 
in some sense no need to 'reinforce' parental obligations — they exist 
and are accepted already. But there is a need to facilitate them through 
an increased understanding of the emotional and moral turmoil that 
follows in the wake of family separation or in the wake of cohabitation 
breakdown or non-marital births. 
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